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l)Ut by which they are moved and renewed and through which
they know how to prepare against the further dangers they
are still to meet.
But there is also the meeting, the building of new commu
nity, the solidarity with those persecuted, those desperately
alienated, who need a sanctuary in which they can lay down
their heads for a while and need not be afraid. And we need
thei,i, for they know about the alienating forces that penetrated
their lives, that were inflicted upon them by our society, our
culture, our morals, our “religion.” When these persecuted
ones come to us, let us hope they cannot say: “Man, man,
why hast thou forsaken us?”
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X5,rhat His Kingdom is: The power, the glory and
compass of it is not comprehended with mortal
understanding His sufferings are free for
love’s sake, that he may bear the infirmities of
the creation; which does in no way take from his
power, who is equal to the Father, but does mani
fest hh power to be unlimited, in that he beareth
all things. His dominion he has amongst the
heathen, anti there is no place where he is not.
But his kingdom in this world in which he chiefly
delights to walk and make himself known is in
the hearts of such as have believed in him He
leads them by gentle movings of his Spirit out of
all their own ways and wills, . . . and guides them
into the will of the Father.
James Nayler: The Lamb’s T/Var
Our Quaker peace testimony is in crucial need of upclat
ing. We know this whenever we look honestly and carefully
at the world around us. Other men too expect Friends to come
up with answers for 7iet Nam and Israel, for the talks in
Helsinki, Paris and Peking, as well as for personal pacifism.
Do we have such answers? Our personal pride is involved
in our peace testimony. It is our best-known social witness,
and it was the model for the forming of others: it was the
First which Quakers reached by a new consensus, rather than
by just reaffirming quite instinctively kindred parts of their
mlrit:in or anabaptist inheritance. Friends refused to fight.
despite community pressure, in the French and Indian War
anti the American Revolution; their stand remained charac
teristic of Friends even in the Civil War and two World
18 19
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\TarS when increasing numbers of born Quakers accepted the
national standard instead. In each of these wars, leading
Friends chose imprisonment rather than fight. Yet now it all
seems past history: some young Friends join SDS or SNCC
more eagerly now than when these groups were non-violent.
Many moi’e would like to be pacifists, as they face the Viet
Nam war, but don’t know on what to base their stand.
It is not (July in the black ghetto or Southeast Asia that
a C. O.’s stand mar seem too simple. Some Friends have made
intuitive ethical decisions winch seem in retrospect wiser than
the arguments they provided. Our lives may speak; our words
(ion i probe. Even though Friends were among the first to
reject both slavery and the Viet Nain war, are we now able to
show others how we knew? Most of us saw in 1945 that it
was not justified to kill a quarter of a million Japanese at
hiroshima and Nagasaki, even if it saved the lives of a quarter
of a million American soldiers and as many Japanese who
would otherwise have fallen in an allied invasion of Japan. It
was not s:mply a question of the wrongness of killing (if some
had to die either way); deeper issues were involved than body-
counts, or even than the balancing of Japanese against Amer
ican lives. Yet most of us find it hard to put into words the
special evil of these acts of impersonal atomic destruction.
It helps our clarity to make distinctions about the kinds
or spheres of ethics involved. We are talking about concrete
decisions here, not about the logic of ethical philosophy nor
the universal bases of good and evil in general. We are also
not stressing purely evaluative judgments of specific good and
bad things.1 For instance a doctor may sympathize with a sick
man’s pain — or may not. He may have beliefs about death.
But these are clearly distinct from what choices he must make
about whether to operate. Generals are not always blind to
the horrors of war when they order an attack. Nonetheless,
evaluations and actions do interact: our evaluation of social
revolution in general and a specific black movement in detail
will shape our actual responses to a black militant.
We also must ask each time who is deciding. The Quaker
pi testimony has traditionally been (a) a matter of indi
vidual decisions in face of war or the draft; and (b) a stand
20
of the Quaker community collectively over against society;
sometimes also (c) a platform or national policy we have
urged upon non-Quakers. F’riends have always assumed that
these ‘.hree levels of decisions go together: we resist Christians
like Reinhold Niebuhr on the one side or the Mennonites on
the other, who want to authorize the state to make decisions
opposite to those proper for individuals.2
I: THE LiMITS OF THE OLD QUAKER PEACE TESTIMONY
The first issue, then, on which our peace testimony is
challenged often turns out to hinge on the level of decision
involved. The personal C. 0. stand (about which I am as con
vinced myself now as 30 years ago) is less important today —
except to those decreasing numbers facing the draft — than
other ultimate issues. The nuclear arms race may never give
most of us a personal choice about bearing arms or killing.
The life-and-death decision may have to be marie for us by a
split-second computer, confirmed by a president’s push-button.
‘The small previous decisions which the survivors may find to
have been crucial are probably those which even the New York
Times will never document. We may never know if Friends
might make some such choices more wisely. They might have
been more alert, with more love or nerve than our actual
negotiators in Helsinki, Vienna or Peking, under unforgiving
pressure from the Russians and Chinese, with a billion lives on
the line. Yet the basic decisions of nations will be shaped by
what is possible for their peoples to live with; in our case the
limit is set by the ethical responses of all Americans to dangers.
We are living by a balance of terror where peace is kept
because each great nation knows that the others have power
to destroy it; whole populations in western Europe and Amer
ica must live with this knowledge, as is true only of rulers
elsewhere. We will go through even more frightening years as
our peoples fully face this, and risk additional nakedness as we
gear clown the nuclear threat. We Friends may be as tempted
to escape this reality through instant disarmament as the army
professionals are tempted by the ABM. At best disannamerit
means unemployment, at worst total vulnerability. If Friends
are to share a vision of how to live with trust, we need more
C)
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than raw courage, self-sacrifice, willingness to die. A new kind
of radicalism about life itself is needed, like that of the pacifist.
A new broader scope of response is also needed in collective
life, a wider historical and social perspective is asked of Friends,
so that we can learn with a whole nation how to live under
such fears.
Here appears a second major challenge to our peace testi
mony, the challenge to non-violence as a social strategy. The
American blacks and Chicanos, not to mention the israelites
and Arab Fedayeen, are skeptical when we preach non-violence
to them. They say they tried it and it didn’t work. We must
concede that movements of non-violence do not always coincide
with the times of awakening of an oppressed people, as hap
pened under Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Cesar
Chavez. Violence, fear and terror are highly visible, and often
achieve dramatic results. We see the cost and evil among
those results. The militant sees how well violence has worked
against himself, and also the subtler forms of oppression (in
an isolated culture, lower castes can be frozen into submission
for thousands of years). Though it may be better to talk of
the oppression or the ‘violation” done by the “establishment,”
rather than about its “violence” (except where police force
is used), the injury by the establishment is evident.
Admittedly historical data also partially vindicate the
kind of conservative who says that rebels justify overt violence
whenever their anger or bitterness spill over. The volcanic
heat of anger against injustice hardens into the hatred which
assumes that “violence is the only language the other side
can understand.’ Indeed this is just what has been told us
by both Israelis and Arabs, both Nazis and Communists.
This outlook leads Americans, too, to dehumanize the enemy:
“slants,” “gooks,” “Japs,” “Hun,””Damyankees,” or whom
ever it may be.
Tue black niilitants and the SDS, then, have not taught
us that violence justifies violence, or that it works better than
non-violence (indeed in their own cases it clearly has not,
only we are too quick to remind them of that). The violent
do teach us that there are other evils as bad as violence, injus
tice being one. Even pacifist saints like Thomas Merton
22
reluse to separate non-violence from social revolution. The
Black Panther or Palestinian terrorist would rather die fight
ing than live as he has done. He sets us down in our places
as ptternalists and patchers-over. Have we an answer that is
not merely individualistic?
Justice is also no absolute. When Jews and Arabs accuse
us of “wanting them to love each other like Christians,” we
recogilize the danger of cultural relativism, both in justice anti
in our peace testimony. Relativism is not a new problem;
absolutist standards of ethics based upon the Bible have been
lading for a long time. We keep finding new shocks, as when
black students ask us what kinds of academic cheating are
really wrong, and not just white men’s middle-class conventions.
even the rebel against non-violence expects to reach us
with his appeal for justice as an objective, a non-relative possi
bility. Whether because of the draft’s endlessness or cultural
change, we are more aware than ever before of the proportion
of C.O’s wrestling with the seeming subjectiveness and relativ
ism of conscience, and of the need to reassure them of the
validity of conscience as a way to truth.
Yet a third challenge to our ieace testimony emerges at
this point, which undercuts all levels of Christian decision, and
even the roots of radical ethics we looked for underneath all
of therri. We sense the self-righteousness in what some “resist
ems” say about their own consciences, and the charge is thrown
against us by the black who regards even our reawakened sense
of justice as paternalist conscience-salving. In a real sense, the
younger generation of white Americans rediscovered original
sin in relation to the race problem. Even our efforts towards
justice, we find, are made as whites with white attitudes (or if
black, with black ones). Whether it means for us innate guilt
or shame or pride, we cannot escape our race merely by wish
ing it were not part of us.
Fear of self-righteousness may underlie the would-be C.O. ‘s
hesitancy as much as does his awareness of relativism. He
may have read Reinhold Niebufir’s attacks on bourgeois self-
righteousness and on the Quakers’ pride in ethical purity.
The hesitant young Friend may recognize the danger in the
rcsitaflce movement as well as in the establishment. Diana
23
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Oughton, who blew herself up in her Washington Square
bomb workshop, has become a symbol of those young people
who seek to escape from l)ourgeoiS guilt into total involve
ment, total commitment, total sell-surrender, and thereby
claim in reverse just that pretended innocence and absolutism
which they rightly condemn in the establishment. The terri
ble passivity of the present student gerseration may be also a
sensitivity to the practical and moral limits of rebellion. Yet
if inaction leads to disaster, the self-righteously “detached”
may he as guilty as any of us.
The problem here is bottomless. Quakers may indeed
be among the more self-righteous of humans. Yet we too
belong to the generation which can never be guiltless again.
The first World War taught this to Europeans as nations, just
as Marx taught them it as classes, and Freud did as individuals.
Now America as a whole is facing a similar problem about the
Viet Nam war. Guilt may first focus on individual Americans
at Mylai; later, on all who are to blame for the heroin-hooked
GI’s or napalmed children. The mere fact of the war directly
involves even more of us, yet here too specific individuals can
be charged and should be. But as in defeat Americans start to
reproach each other, we may have even worse to go through.
What may happen in Saigon and Taipei afterward will leave
none of us guilt-free. if we can avoid unloading our own guilt
onto each other, perhaps at the end of our humiliation we
Americans can rejoin the human race and recognize our own
limits, as the Germans, British and French have had to do in
the past thirty years. Even as Quakers we cannot duck out, but
if we have learned to claim our heritage as forgiven sinners
from Martin Luther and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, we can accept
whatever kinds of humbling bring us back to the grace and
forgiveness of God.
The judgment against self-righteousness may seem to
undercut all forms of Quaker peace testimony. Yet as Friends
we also remember George Fox’s warning against pleading for
sin. The hunger for perfection of a Diana Oughton should
awake echoes in Friends, though we are likely to recognize the
possibility to be even farther off, and more inward, than did
Fox. At the least, the world’s desperate crisis demands more
24
of us than men have ever achieved before. How do we keep
the goal of perfection and the consistency of pacifists, without
being absolutists about scripture or conscience, and without
pride?
We ate thus driven into deeper plulosophical questions.
How can we say ‘yes” to every person and every part of life,
yet also “rio” to what is but should not be so? When do we
say “yes” and when “no” to death and suffering? How do we
say the world is one, lawful and good, and still keep a fulcrum
4 on which to balance a radical ethic?j Some Friends may have no such problems. They can keepwith an undivided mind their reverence for the sheer authorityof the Ten Commandments and of conscience. Others will
4
face the draft board with nothing more than an intuitive “Here
I stand; I cannot do otherwise.” And they may need to be
reassured that the intuition of men is a valid way to truth,
4 cven in the arts and sciences.4Once we have been challenged by basic problems, however,tmany of us will not be satisfied unless we can reach toward a
clearer way to see moral problems, a new basis for our peace
testimony. Most Christian pacifists have been absolutists,
usually out of a strict or literal obedience to Jesus’ recorded
teachings and examples; if not, then out of refusal to violate
the absolute sanctity of human life. Indeed it is a little dis
couraging to find so little new said for these positions in the
last 35 years.5 While many of us may now find it hard to
absolutize biblical commands or principles, because of the
limits of human language and understanding, we’d like to
keep and extend, not abolish, the binding and universal spirit
of these approaches. That some deeper or broader basis is
needed, however, seems clear from our discussions of the limits.
of the C. 0. stanch.
II: AN ETHIC OF RESPONSE
Our starting point can be the ethical response of act or
attention we make to the call of God we finch in each moment.
This is the clearly common bond between several convincing
recent writers on Christian ethics: Richard Niebuhr’s ethic of
response and the responsible self, Paul Lehmann’s call to “con-
I
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textual ethics and Rudolf liultmaiin’s existeutmi ethics of the
ever-present moawni of dechion and lestmnse to ( ;od’s woi’d.
Gordon Kau[n ini attempts w make contextual response the
basis cveii of Mennon:te ethics h) showing Gods 05\lI actions
in Christ as part 01 our context.6 lhese views have similarities
too with what is called ‘‘situation ethics.’’ For all these men,
right end wrong depend in pert on i:he immediate moment
and situation, and the right action cannot be defined in
ad atice. ‘Flie key diflerence among diem is that “situation’’ is
sometimes defined just in terms of a human relationship to be
met with acts of love, putting all the emphasis on the free choice
and action of the individual: he loves, he sees, he acts. The con
textual or response perspectives stress our own meeting with
God in each encounter with men, and our own dependence on
1iem arid past events we see as h:s acts. This response to
God iii each moment assumes, as Martin Luther says. that we
can treat each choice or job or human relationship as a prob
lem or task set br God. as “given’ by his will. Calvin’s ethic
includes tit is view — he calls it Providence — coupled with
strong law conceptions and a certainty that God will use and
overrule for his own purposes whatever we do.
Behind 1)0th Luther and Calvin stand Augustine and Paul:
if one watches 1mw all of these men try to view their journeys
anti hardships, their inner crises and even their disappoint
ments, in a spirit of constant prayer and wonder, one sees how
magnificent this perspective can be.
Yet none of these men were pacifists. All have been called
social conservatives. Thus I can ji.istify a “contextual” basis
1for a peace testimony only by interlocking it with the future
oriented, kingdom-centered thought of time European “theology
of hope” today. I hope to show how these two persPectives
meet also in what Jesus understood about the kingdom of God.
This may also show their kinship with early Quaker outlooks.
particularly those re-emphasized today by Canhy Jones anti
Rob Tucker under the symbol of “the Lamb’s War.”
It is possible to describe this “ethic of response” in rela
tion to those modern trends in sociology and psychology where
time essence of man is seen as the organic wholeness of his
respouse to all that is in and around him. Some Sod ioiogists
would CII11)hiaSi/e how’ touch our responses are affected by the
social cominuriti es, Ian uages, and special interests or mind—
sets we come out of. Some philosophers, by contrast, empha
5i’e (as Martin Buher does) the uniquely person-to-person
na ttmre of ‘I-Thou relationships,” in contrast to all “I-it”
responses where 1 manipulate timings or people for my own
ends. Again, Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr emphasized the
economic and social stnLctures present in all our human rela
tionships. l here is no need to choose between these emphases
within an etinc of response: all these depict parts of the actual
con text we respond to. Indeed, I would go farther, and weave
into our context-pattern two more [actors often used inclepend
ently as starting-points for ethics: first, the sense of duty or
obligation, which need never be cut off from our actual capac
itv to meet people’s needs, from our actual rCsIJOiiSibIlilV
second, our ethics should never leave out responses to beauty,
to goodness and to joy. These may be the true heart of the
instant situation, as they are for the artist, or on the other
hand we may bring these highlights into grim immediate con
texts from the totality of the world as we know it. Clearly I
am assuming our response is that of whole persons, where emo
tion and understanding and intellectual planning are never
divorced.
This “ethic of response,’’ then, is likely to emphasize love
not as a self-sufficient human capacity (as the “situationist” is
tempted to rio) but as the spontaneity of man’s response to
other men’s love and to God’s goodness to us. We love because
he first loved us: when you have said this, you then dare to
say “love God and do as you will,” with Augustine, because
loving men follows unsought from gratitude to God. There is
thus hope that this ethic of response can bypass the jungle of
self-righteousness. We will never fully know if our response
to a person or situation was the right one. Even if it was, the
next new moment will demand equal awareness, anti perhaps
a different response. XVhen we find afterward that we did in
fact act responsively or lovingly toward someone, it is often a
surprise: we did not think of it at the time; it was a kind
of miracle, like self-forgetfulness.
I
26
5
Barbour: The God of Peace: The Root of Radical Pacifism
Published by Digital Commons @ George Fox University, 1972
An ethic of response can usually avoid both too great
iiidiviclnahsm and tot) little concern for justice. Justice must
enter into the situation for the sake of love for the victim; to
respond to each man in his situation is inevitably complex.
This was really what the Niebuhr brothers both said, in their
detailed books about labor relations, international political
conflicts, anti American history: they never despised love, but
the ethic of response bgiiis with the facts of human need. By
their concern to respond alertly, the Niebuhrs were in practice
often more open-eyed than their Quaker Opponents.
An ethic of response can usually avoid relativism. By ask
ing us to act in terms of “what is actually going on,” it has a
built-rn “truth-element.” Natural law is not of itself an abso
lute commandment, but it points to the fact that among the
‘givens” which God lays before us are the structures and order
liness of nature. It is possible to be very detailed indeed about
economic and political systems and how they affect our efforts
to apply love in human encounter. Human and physical nature
are not uniform or timeless; situations change, but the changes
can be measured and predicted. People differ but each person
can be known increasingly thoroughly.
The limits our human insight places upon fully truthful
response to God, people and situations cannot ever fully be
outflanked. Abstract formulations, however precise our science,
are human summations. Even a direct message of the Spirit
in Hebrew or English, however rich those languages are,
cannot be absolute revelation, for words are not absolute. By
seeing our limits, we can respect them and even partially trans
cend them, as for instance we learn from Marx or Freud some
of our biases and blindnesses. How far can we push this? A
mathematician expects to discipline his mind until the forms
of its response correspond in impressive ways with the uflgTasp
able forms or patterns that seem to underlie the universe. But
in human relationships the depth and pervasiveness of self
deception and pride take us right into the thought-world of
the Bible and early Quakerism.
Not simply Friends, then, but all Christians, witness to the
pover of evil to pervert our responses: pride, anger and hatred
lead not cnly to evil actions but to inability to see truthfully
28
what we respond to in any action. The original sin about
which Paul and Calvin spoke had little to do with whether
men are inherently ‘‘good’’ or “bad’’: these nien saw the per
vasiveness with which every part of our thinking, seeing and
doing is distorted anti permeated by self-centereclness. Early
Friends did not disagree here. They complimented no-one,
considered no man righteous until he had sat, as they had
done, for months anti years unravelling all his ethical thoughts
and acts under the searchlight of the Inner Light. In this
1rging Friends had quaked, not only in mass meetings but
still more in small silent ones or alone.
‘The difference between Friends and Luther or Niebuhr
or eveim Freud is not in the starting evaluation of men but in
the expectation. Luther and Niebuhr were sensitive to how
our awareness of our limits and distortions tempts us to despair
and drives us into worse sins. Their answer was a kind of
realism not lar from pessimism. The Niebuhr brothers saw
the terror by which Hitler and Stalin ruled; but their answers
were military restraint upon Germany and Russia plus the
self-restraint and humility America needed. Fox never stopped
there. He and Nayler, Penington and Penn (not just Barclay)
said as violent things as John Calvin about the evil in all men.
They complained that Calvinist preachers were too optimistic
about how easily God would accept human sin. Early Quakers
were harsher on self-will than were the predestinarians. Friends
escaped pessimism because they had seen what the power of
God could do. As dramatically and totally as the Spirit had
changed their own lives, they said, the Spirit could reach any
man. Within each man was placed the Seed of the Spirit, a
capacity to respond. Hence Fox wrote to the Pope, the Sultan,
anti the Emperor of China. These were not convinced, but
many others were.
More than the mere possibility of man’s response in a new
way was involved. Early Friends expected the power of the
r Spirit, which had led the Quaker movement to sweep through
England anti the American colonies, to transform the world
soon alter. Friends believed that God himself meant to make
the whole world into his kingdom and lead all men to live as
Quakers cud. Friends were the “wave of the future.”
29
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Contextual ethics, Richard Niebuhr said, must include
within tire present context of men’s decisions what God has
done in the past, and what he is doing, as part of our “field of
vision.’ But what God will do creates an ethic of faith and
hope even more than of love. We need to remind ourselves
constantly of what God does and has done in Christ, to show
us his love and forgiveness. Yet this makes Christ curious,
timeless, undynamic, unless we can say more.
III: IJIE EFHIC OF THE FUTURE
A new movtment of theology has arisen in Europe called
the “theology of hope,” led by men like Jurgen Moltmann,
Johinnes Metz and Wolfhart Pannenberg. These men show
the connections between the genuine newness of the future
and tire reality of freedom in the present. Hope is not simply
pioaI afterlife or for human history, but distinctive
response to the universe as a whole. These siren see God him
self not as tire ruler of the present age, but as the eternal
creator of what is still to be. An ethic is based on this: man
too is given the power to make the future arid to prepare him
self for it; once again the kingdom of God provides the norms
for ethics. This theology is heady stuff; it is meant as a Chris
tian answer to Marxism’s deterministic hope and the new
dreams of tEe developing nations: “The God who is our
future and who creates anew man’s future ... shows himself as
the God who gives us in Jesus Christ the opportunity to build
the future, to make all things new, and to rise above our own
sinful history.”7
There remains a deeply paradoxical tension between the
present and the future, which may be made clearer by noticing
three ways this relationship can be oversimplified.
For some theologians the future is no more than fulfilment
of what now is. Metz, for instance, assumes that Catholic dogma
will hold true for all future ages. Within the Christian tradi
tion there have been upholders of this view since biblical times.
John’s Gospel sees eternal life as already begun: Christ has
already given new life and all the answers. Even if “the world
l)ases away’’ and it is indeed “the last hour’’ (I John 2:17, 18)
Christ is already ‘‘the Way, the Truth and the Life,” and
neither a return of Christ nor a day of judgment will bring
much new for the believer All’’process philosophers” share
this danger of simply unfolding the known process into future
rears: notice the curiously conservative theology even of White-
head. The most kindling and inclusive such figure, Teilhard
de Chardin, sees tire ultimate goal of both evolution and history
as an “omega point’ ivhere all men by “Christification” will
become one and all like Christ; et ‘reilhard never took seri
ously enough the patterns of evil and the newness that a world
without e ii would show. The ethic of such a view asks us to
affirm the future reign of present good.
Over against the future as fulfilment, men like Moltmann
hold up tire future as totally open, unknown, unknowable.
Even the historical Jesus, our anchor for hope in past experi
ence, becomes our model because he was totally open to what
God might do beyond any man’s imagination: “Of that (lay
or- that hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor
the Son, but only the Father” (Mark 13:32). So for Moltmann
“the Christian expectation is directed to no other than Christ
who has come, but it expects something new from him, some
thing that has not yet happened so far.”8 This viewpoint too
can be found in the New Testament, especially in Mark: “You
do not know the power of God: when they rise from the dead,
men and women do not marry; they are like the angels in
heaven” (12:25). (As “hard sayings” and as they leave the
luture solely in Gods hands, these from Mark have good claim
to be words of Jesus himself.) Moltmann tries hard to main
tain the reality of both present and future and the tension
between them, yet we must ask if such a hope gives enough
meaning or guidance in the present. An ethic of openness is
as much captive to the future as an ethic of obedience is to
the How can we give body to the future in our hope
ful actions, if it is to be totally different, totally unrelated and
unknown? Death has these features of total “otherness,” and
we trust it only because we trust the life or the living God
whom we have known. Sartre comes close to the directionless
openness of total freedom — except as a politician. Pannen
berg, when he tries to overcome this duality, seems at times to
make the present and all history a dependency of the future:
I
I’
II
30 31
7
Barbour: The God of Peace: The Root of Radical Pacifism
Published by Digital Commons @ George Fox University, 1972
‘God is God oui in the manner that the luture has power
over the r resen t.’
Between a Future that merely fulfills the pres.. ut and one
which totally negates it, stands a v ision which siniily reverses
it. At first glance i: may look radical. In the future ag-c, the
suffering righteous will be rewarded, and see the punishment of
the wicked. Wh n “the revolution’’ comes, the poor will rule.
This tradition has its New Testament representative too, in
that other John who wrote the Book of Revelation to portray
Christ as the triumphant Lamb who will reverse the powers of
the world. Yet often the ethic which results merely combines
hatred of the present with patience until God or histoiy will
achieve the overt urning. The Pharisees of Jesus’ day believed
that iF all Israel kept the Law of God for a single day, the
Messiah would come. Patience may hold firm up to the doors
of Auschwitz, but if this ethic does lead to revolt, it is likely
merely to transfer old power to new hands. One tragedy of
this position is that it foreordains what God must do to restore
justice: it is thus simply a highly polarized version of the
fulfilment hope.
We must ask whether Friends can cia any better at relat
irig the present and future. Early Friends tended to regard the
power of the Spirit as already demonstrably present, but the
forms it would create in the future as unknowable. Friends
said that Christ has come, but kept a sense of openness and
mystery about his kingdom. They accepted the puritan belief
that the saints were to rule, yet Friends were the only Common
wealth group who did not claim to know how they would do it.
But their only guard against identifying the future as fulfil
ment of the present dream was to stress the “otherriess’’ of the
power of the Spirit, its opposition to all human desires and
pride, all libertine enthusiasm, and to stress the new way as
suffering: “No Cross, No Crown.” In this situation Friends
often slipped near the edge of defining the future in terms of
rejection of self — a man-macic antithesis like the shallower or
more self-righteous revolutionary ethic of the future as simple
reversal of present power.
Viien we do try. however, to point out the concrete present
or future acts of God, Christ, or the Spirit, we find ourselves
back in ambiguity. Though early Friends saw tlHs hiddenness
and mystery of the present power of God, and spoke of it as
Jesus cud, using as central terms for these issues “faith” ami
‘‘the Spirit,’’ their ideas-and experiences are not enough guide
lines br our own ‘‘testing of spirits.” We turn back then to
what Jesus showed about the present and future kingdom.
We must first recognize that most Israelites in Jesus’ clay
(all hut the 1-lellenized peasants anti Sadducees) expected the
kingdom of God in some form. The intensity of their hope
macic their age unique. They expected God to conquer evil
soon and completely, in one or all of evil’s most visible forms.
At least three of these forms of evil corresponded to visions of
the kind of kingdom God would thus bring. The Davidic
kingdom would be the overthrowing of evil in the form of
hunian oppression. in the all too visible form of the Roman
Empire. To overthrow Rome a human Messiah might suffice,
if God and Israel both supported him fully. Many candidates
foi the role arose among the Zealots, and during the Jewish
revolts of 70 and 135 A. D. even the Pharisees hailed their
leaders in Messianic terms. Another Jewish party saw evil in
more basically earthy terms, and expected a new heaven and a
new earth where famine and death would disappear and every
vine and wheat-stalk produce miracle crops. Such a kingdom
might need no Messiah: God’s power and angels could do it.
Finally, some Jews went farsher and saw the earthly powers of
cvii themselves as supernatural . Armageddon would be fought
iii heaven, anti “the principalities and powers of the darkness
of this age,” along with evil men, would be cast into hell by an
angelic “Son of Man.” Dostoievski seems right (in the “Grand
Inquisitor” chapter of The Biothers Karamazov) in interpret
big Jesus’ own three temptations at the start of ins ministry as
his rejection of these three models for the kingdom of God.
In rejecting them, Jesus says that it is God’s kingdom, and he
must bring it in his own way, in his own time. Not even
Jesus will force his hand.
This kind of insight, along with the awareness of God’s
lrese power, seems to underlie all the Gospel accounts. Geth
I IV: JESUS .NI) [HE KINGDOM
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semane seems to show that Jesus accepted the cross as being
God’s will without himself making or using it as a way to
bring the kingdom: how God will bring the kingdom out of
Christ’s death seems to be just what he cannot know. What
sort of foundation for a kingdom was humanly visible, when
he died as a terrorist arid even the twelve disciples who seemed
most nearly to understand him were frightened and scattered?
What kind of victory over evil was this? At Jesus’ death the
kingdom seems hidden even from himself.
The so-called ‘mystery of the kingdom” (Mark 4:11) is
one of tIre standing puzzles of New Testament scholarship.
Each New Testament author presents the kingdom and its
Jiidth’nness in a different way. Matthew’s Gospel borrows a
way of seeing present and future not unlike the Pharisees’:
what is hidden now will be revealed; what is now done in secret
will be rewarded openly; in the Judgment Day all will be
reversed. Only the parables, riot Jesus or even the kingdom.
are niysteria in Matthew 13, which otherwise parallels Mark
4. Mark has preserved a keener sense of mystery. He sees
Jesus as the already-come incognito Messialì, who will one
day return in uclgment. Meanwhile Christ is recognized
only by the elect few, and Jesus rebukes even Peter and the
demons when they are about to spill the secret. Yet Mark’s
secret Messiah also points to acts of God done secretly (4:12).
By contrast, Luke finds the mystery mainly in the inwardness
and loving nature of God’s universal power. John’s Gospel
assumes that Jesus has already revealed all he will ever need to,
so that the mystery takes an opposite form, the mystery of men’s
blindness to the power already present in that one life.
I’he Gospels seem each to be grasping towards something
beyond ms all. Trying to go beyond these Christian witnesses
to Jesus’ own consciousness about himself is the most danger
ous of all biblical games, and niany scholars humbly refuse to
play it. Yet “Superstars” rush in, and I too cannot let it alone.
There is some comfort in the fact that the view of the kingdom
here presented is closest to the two oldest sources, Mark’s Gos
pel and tire source from which Luke and Matthew drew most
of their narables and sayings of Jesus, often called the “Q
source.”
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The sense of God’s present power iii Jesus, which is corn
bined so awkwardly in the Gospels with the hiddenness of the
kingdom, is also a clue to a wider understanding of both. All
three models of Jewish hope, though constructed out of present
realities, were put wholly into the future. Man’s role, except
as the Zealots saw it, was to wait in righteous patience. It was
God’s indifference to present evil that made any Jew who did
not live by the future into a gentle cynic. Such was Ecclesias
tes, for whom “the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the
strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, but
time and chance happen to them all” (9:11), and ‘‘this is an
evil in all that is done under the sun, that one fate comes to
all’’ (11:3). This preacher would be startled that today’s folk
singers rejoice at the way all things “turn, turn, turn,” and that
“there is a time for all things under the sun.” For Ecclesiastes,
“the sun rises and the sun goes down” but “all are from the
dust aiid all turn to dust again” (2:20, 2:1, 1:5). Jesus saw
the same facts: the Tower of Siloam fell on the just and the
unjust alike, and Pilate killed good men along with bad (Luke
13:1-4). Jesus too ascribed this indiscriminateness to God, who
“makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends his
rain on the just and on the unjust” (Matt. 5:45). But Jesus
calls this perfection, and the ethical result is to ask his disciples
to love their enemies and thus “be perfect” as God is (5:48).
Jesus told parables about this seeming indifference of God,
as between good men and wicked: the wheat and weeds were
to be let grow together, and the good and bad fish were to be
hauled in in the same net (Matt. 13:24-30, 47-50, cf. also the
Parable of the Sower). In some cases he tied this up with God’s
mercy to the undeserving, as with the workers in the vineyard
who each received a day’s wage whether they had worked one
hour or twelve (Matt. 20:1-16). Naturally the Gospel writers
interpreted such parables with a special eye on how God, in
sending Jesus, had shown equal favor to the unrighteous gen
tiles as to the law-abiding Jews. But Jesus called all these
parables of the kingdom. They must therefore have something
to do with how God overcomes evil. The Prodigal Son parable
shows how Jesus understood this: by impartiality between bad
men and good, God shows the love that wins back the rebel
35
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and tlLe disobedient. These parables describe how God now
works, but dais is the coii text of the kingdom to winch men’s
actions must respond All Jesus’ sayings about his lfliSSlOfl to
sinners, and about the disciples’ duty to love the outcast, rep
resent the same love that makes repelitance and reconciliation
possible. They do not praise mavericks and rough diamonds,
nor are they conditional upon the prior repentance of the
wicked. They are simply the way that trust and acceptance are
restoiecl .Al1 that the Jews had seen as God’s absence or
hiddenness. then, Jesus saw as his presence and power, though
ciuCIt) and suffering remain a mystery.
Froni tins starting-point we should also react all Jesus’
saviligs about the hiddenriess of the kingdom and the signs of
it. The Pharisees were looking for indubitable signs for a
kingdom to come. and Jesus answered that “the kingdom of
God is not coming with signs to be observed; for behold the
kinedcin of God is in your midst’ (Luke 17:20-21). Yet he
would turn about and say “Can you not understand the signs
of the times?” and “he ‘xho has eyes to see, let him see,” or
“do you not yet understand?” The kingdom could only be
seen by faith; it was hidden in the present world like yeast or
buried seed. Men must watch for it and respond, as for the
midnight bridegroom or for a thief in the night (Matt. 16:33;
Mark 8:18, 17; Mark 13:34; Matt. 24:43). Among the events in
which Jesus saw both the love anti the poss’er of God were the
healings which occurred when men trusted God or Jesus, and
he wos furious when men credited these to Satan, though it
needed faith too to see them as God’s work. Sometimes he
ascribed these to the Spirit, or to God’s mercy, sometimes to
God’s power released through prayer: “If it is by the finger of
God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of c;od has
come upon you” (Luke 11:20). This was the power of the
kingdom itself. Yet even more often he identiFies the healing
with the faith of those who were healed (Matt. 12:28, 32; Mark
5:19, 9:29 and 5:34). Evidently mens response to the hidden
power was itself an element of that power.
As we can see both in the darkness of Gethsemane and in
Nayler’s own way of describing the kingdom, there is a par
aclox in the present working of God’s power. It depends on
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human responSes that may not come across. The ethic which
Jesus teaches is based not on what God has said or clone, nor
on what God will someday do, but on what he is now doing.
Yet this ethic of response to “what is now going on” includes
within the context of the present not only universally verifi
able facts, but what faith sees God as doing. This is a strange
g factuality, like die logic of a mathematical equation whichincludes a term for the square root of minus one. One of thefacts ice are asked La respond to is the love of God which most
men cannot see.
Ii this leap of faith is possible for us, the love of God
works thereafter as an axiom which makes the rest of Jesus’
ethic logical. ‘We are to love our enemies because “we have
no choice” but to see them as God does. We must forgive the
brother seventy times seven because this is the way the bonds
to him remain unbroken by which the power of God can be let
loose. Forgiveness and love do not forbid (and may require)
opposing the brother, but we have no claim on him or anyone,
because God can claim it all. We are to forgive those who owe
us even a small debt, because as “a matter of plain fact” KMatt.
18:28-35) — in relation to God — “we have been forgiven”
S20,000,000, and we cannot ever live as if we had repaid it and
were free to build an independent fortune. It seems a strange
perspective, changing all our perceptions though not making
either the new or the old views illusory: it is rather like being
in love. In this perspective, the ethic of the kingdom is not an
interim-ethic, justified by the fact that it need not be kept up
for long, like Paul’s attitude to marriage; nor is it a postpon
able ethic that will only be valid when the kingdom fully
coiries and all men return our love. It is simply the way God
now works, our present context, and we can have no other
standard.
\: ()UAKER RAI)ICALISM AX1) PEACE
For the Quaker paciFist, this ethic seems to mean that lie
(Toes not have to prove that pacifism works, neither does he
have to show literalistic obedience to a legalistic code of God’s
commands. It is proper to affirm, indeed it is all we can do,
that we believe that this is the way of God’s power in our
37
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present age. Moreover, we do not have to prove our own con
sistency. since we rely on his consistency. This is his way of
working. If we are driven into some desperate corner like
those the militarists throw up at conscientious objectors, and
cannot see any way out except to protect forcibly that assaulted
grandmother or child, we do not need either to give up, or
to assume there was no other way out.
A truth-element has always been part of Quaker ethics: in
fact the conimonest name for the early Quaker way of life
was simply “Truth.” It was “true” to man’s nature to make
no distinction between workingmen and nobles, slaves and free
men. It was “true” grammar to say “thee” and “thou” and
true to nature to ask a single price for each object sold.
It also became clear to them that if war or slavery was
wrong for one Friend, nothing in the situation would make it
right for another. Consciences of nìen were not all fully awak
ened, and must he followed as far as Light was given, but con
science was not an end in itself.
The formation of the original Quaker peace testimony
hinged on this issue of consistency and uniformity. The first
Friends had never wanted to tie God’s hands. When Mary
Dyer and Humphrey Norton were told by Governor Endicott
that they could go home free from Massachusetts to Rhode
Island, provided they promised never to return, the Friends
answered that they could never promise today what the Lord
would command tomorrow. Back to jail they went, and when
they did return to the attack they were hanged. Thus also
when George Fox told the Derby magistrates in 1650 that he
could not accept a captaincy in Cromwell’s army because he
“lived by the Spirit which took away the occasion of wars,” he
did not thereby create a peace testimony binding upon all
Friends. Repeatedly, early Friends said that outward violence
was irrelevant since the true struggle against evil must be
fought within. Yet Penn and others approved all their lives
the use of police restraint. When, in 1659, the puritan Com
monwealth crumbled, for the sake of which so many lives had
been given against royal dictatorship, and for which even many
Quakers had in pre-convincement days been soldiers, all the
gains br religious liberty and democracy were threatened. An
appeal went out to the Friends from the tottering governnient
for help against a possible royalist revolution: would the
Quakers serve as commissioners of the militia? Some Friends
like George Bishop were willing to serve. Fox for some weeks
was literally sick with doubt, but finally saw that even in this
deepest darkness Friends could not fight. The puritans did
fall, and Quakers did go into 25 years of savage persecution
under Charles lI’s government. Yet one reason why the prisons
finally opened was that all England recognized what Friends
had said since 1660, that the Spirit of God would never lead
them to use the outward sword, They and their enemies could
count on that, however stubborn the Friends’ non-violent resist
ance, and no matter how much other puritans still hankered
for the “good old cause” when the Lord had called them to
he the army of the saints under Cromwell.
This question of uniformity or consistency, often confused
with absolutism, was raised repeatedly in Quaker history. Many
Quakers had opposed slavery, but John Woolman convinced
them that this was a testimony they must all share. Always lie
labored to convince the conscience of each individual slave
owner, but in the end Friends saw it as an objective standard
of “truth” and were ready to disown any Quaker slaveholcler.
Even on lesser matters like dress, gambling, and business ethics,
Quakers were disowned who did not “live according to Truth.”
‘We must also face the fact that early Friends and Gandhi,
who all spoke of ethics in terms of truth, expected to be led
in each main step by the Spirit of God, which might contra
dict custom and reason.At first sight the Quakers’ inner voice
also contradicts the outwardness of an ethic of response. To
tackle tfie challenges involved: we must first repeat that inner
intuition and response to outward reality are not as divorced
as they seem, and that the same answers may often be truly
prescnted by reason in one case and intuition in another.
Second, we are hard pressed to distinguish wise human insight
from the direct leading of God’s voice. Both may often be
involved in what we tenn “leadings” or “guidance.” What is
crucial, as both Fox and Gandhi made clear, is to purge away
relentlessly those elements within ourselves which make truth
fulness hard or impossible, the corrupting effects of our sub-
I
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jectivity and disoljeience and above all pride. Whether the
goal is object iritv or religious awareness, the process is like the
cleansing of laboratory equipnient. Quaker attitudes to luxury
were strikingly like Gandhi’s in being the austerity of the ath
lete or the stripping down of the life-saver. If Gandhi’s celi
bicy. Kierkegaard’s and Paul’s, seem unnatural, keel.) a sense
of humor about the gimmicks by which you yourself get ready
to respond to “the high calling.”
‘I’his does not mean that non-violence is a way that will
be painless or b) human views successful. The real barrier
will hr our own faith and hope in the situations which repulse
or crush us, in face of our own death or the defeat of what we
saw to be possible: then our own hope will fail, and still Jesus’
way would he ahead. If at other times we find that anyhow we
are loved, by mcii anti by God, that in spite of ourselves love
has worked through us too, then the times when we could not
jnnli our own strength further may show us that a new pow’er
is at work. That does make free response, love and joy easier.
Meanwhile we are looking at the situation to which we
need to respond, and perhaps it is a knife-carrying addict from
the ghetto or a totally intolerant millowner or Wallaceite, and
a new factor has been added to what we understand as the con
crete situation. But when the possibility of love and recon
ciliation enters the situation the other elements remain in it
too. Often one effect of the real vision of God’s love is a bit
more intelligence and imagination about the hard and prac
tical factors that must be dealt with. So most Quakers who
have macic the biggest ethical mark have not looked like radi
cals at all. ‘.\oolman did not look as radical as Garrison, nor
Penn as Roger Wrilliams. We need to think again about what
really constitutes radicalism; and while it includes radical vul
nerability, radical openness to new truth and new awareness,
and radical obedience to what calls may be laid LTOfl us, what
else can we say? The root of our radicalism is not in our
selves, l)ut bevondi, in the way God works and will work.
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